

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 1216

To support Taiwan’s international space, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 31, 2025

Mr. VAN HOLLEN (for himself, Mr. CURTIS, and Mr. KIM) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To support Taiwan’s international space, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Taiwan Allies Fund
5 Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) Taiwan is a free and prosperous democracy
9 of more than 23,000,000 people and an important
10 contributor to peace and stability around the world.

1 (2) The People’s Republic of China has engaged
2 in a years-long campaign to diplomatically isolate
3 Taiwan on the world stage.

4 (3) Since 2013, the Gambia, São Tomé and
5 Príncipe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina
6 Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, Kiribati,
7 Nicaragua, Honduras, and, most recently in 2024,
8 Nauru have severed diplomatic relations with Tai-
9 wan in favor of diplomatic relations with the Peo-
10 ple’s Republic of China.

11 (4) The People’s Republic of China has used
12 economic and diplomatic intimidation against coun-
13 tries pursuing unofficial relations with Taiwan, in-
14 cluding Lithuania, Czechia, and the United States.

15 (5) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public
16 Law 96–8) states that it is the policy of the United
17 States “to maintain the capacity of the United
18 States to resist any resort to force or other forms
19 of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the
20 social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan”.

21 (6) The Taiwan Allies International Protection
22 and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019
23 (Public Law 116–135) states that the United States
24 Government should—

1 (A) “support Taiwan in strengthening its
2 official diplomatic relationships as well as other
3 partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific
4 region and around the world”; and

5 (B) “consider, in certain cases as appro-
6 priate and in alignment with United States in-
7 terests, increasing its economic, security, and
8 diplomatic engagement with nations that have
9 demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or up-
10 graded relations with Taiwan”.

11 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

12 It is the sense of Congress that the United States
13 Government should—

14 (1) advocate, as appropriate, for Taiwan’s pres-
15 ence on the global stage, including at international
16 organizations;

17 (2) promote the preservation and expansion of
18 Taiwan’s official diplomatic relations with countries
19 around the world;

20 (3) expand Taiwan’s unofficial relations with
21 countries around the world;

22 (4) encourage countries with unofficial relations
23 with Taiwan to deepen their engagement; and

24 (5) advance the economic development of coun-
25 tries that support democratic partners like Taiwan.

1 **SEC. 4. TAIWAN ALLIES FUND.**

2 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the
3 amounts made available under the Countering PRC Influen-
4 ce Fund for each of the fiscal years 2026, 2027, and
5 2028, there is authorized to be appropriated \$40,000,000
6 for each such fiscal year to support Taiwan’s international
7 space.

8 (b) ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.—Amounts available pur-
9 suant to the authorization of appropriations under sub-
10 section (a) may be used in countries that—

11 (1) maintain official relations with Taiwan or
12 have meaningfully strengthened unofficial relations
13 with Taiwan;

14 (2) have been subject to coercion or pressure by
15 the People’s Republic of China due to their relations
16 with Taiwan; and

17 (3) lack the economic or political capability to
18 effectively respond to such coercion or pressure by
19 the People’s Republic of China without the support
20 of the United States.

21 (c) USE OF FUNDS.—Amounts available pursuant to
22 the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a)
23 may be used to support any of the following activities in
24 the countries described in subsection (b):

25 (1) To support health initiatives that provide
26 alternatives to the Health Silk Road.

1 (2) To build the capacity and resilience of civil
2 society, media, and other nongovernmental organiza-
3 tions in countering the influence and propaganda of
4 the People's Republic of China.

5 (3) To diversify supply chains away from the
6 People's Republic of China.

7 (4) To provide alternatives to People's Republic
8 of China development assistance and project financ-
9 ing.

10 (5) To advance Taiwan's meaningful participa-
11 tion in international fora and multilateral organiza-
12 tions.

13 (6) To work with the private sector to provide
14 United States or allied alternatives to People's Re-
15 public of China information and communications
16 technology infrastructure and components.

17 (d) LIMITATION ON FUNDS.—A country described in
18 subsection (b) may not receive more than \$5,000,000 of
19 funds made available pursuant to the authorization of ap-
20 propriations under subsection (a) during any fiscal year.

21 (e) IMPLEMENTATION.—

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in
23 consultation with the Administrator for the United
24 States Agency for International Development, the
25 Director of the American Institute in Taiwan, and

1 the heads other relevant Federal agencies, shall co-
2 ordinate and carry out activities described in sub-
3 section (c).

4 (2) AUTHORITIES.—Amounts available pursu-
5 ant to the authorization of appropriations under
6 subsection (a) may be considered foreign assistance
7 under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
8 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) for purposes of making avail-
9 able the administrative authorities in that Act and
10 may be transferred to, and merged with, funds made
11 available for any provision of the Foreign Assistance
12 Act of 1961 to carry out the purposes of this sec-
13 tion, except that such funds shall remain available
14 until expended.

15 (3) COORDINATION WITH TAIWAN.—In order to
16 maximize cost efficiency and eliminate duplication,
17 the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Ad-
18 ministrator for the United States Agency for Inter-
19 national Development, should work with the Director
20 of the American Institute in Taiwan to ensure co-
21 ordination with relevant parties of Taiwan, as appro-
22 priate.

23 (4) COST-SHARING WITH TAIWAN.—The Sec-
24 retary of State should convey to relevant parties of
25 Taiwan, as appropriate, that Taiwan should con-

1 tribute commensurate assistance to countries de-
2 scribed in subsection (b).

3 (5) REPORT.—

4 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year
5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
6 annually thereafter for two years, the Secretary
7 of State shall submit to the appropriate con-
8 gressional committees a report on activities de-
9 scribed in this section that were carried out
10 during the preceding fiscal year.

11 (B) ELEMENTS.—Each report required by
12 subparagraph (A) shall include—

13 (i) with respect to each activity de-
14 scribed in subsection (c)—

15 (I) the amount of funding for the
16 activity;

17 (II) the goal to which the activity
18 relates; and

19 (III) an assessment of the suc-
20 cess of the activity to meet the goal to
21 which the activity relates; and

22 (ii) with respect to this subsection—

23 (I) the amount of funding for the
24 activity provided by Taiwan during
25 the preceding year, if any; and

1 (II) an assessment of whether
2 the funding described in subclause (I)
3 is commensurate with funding pro-
4 vided by the United States.

5 (f) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-
6 tion may be construed to apply to or limit United States
7 foreign assistance not provided using amounts available
8 pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under sub-
9 section (a).

10 (g) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
11 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
12 gressional committees” means—

13 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
14 Senate; and

15 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
16 House of Representatives.

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